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Abstract 
 
Mexico, as other Latin American countries, undertook far-reaching economic reforms in 
the 1980s and 1990s in a wide array of areas. As a result, the Mexican economy 
experienced outstanding export growth, successful insertion into global markets and a shift 
towards medium and high-technology industries. Yet productivity growth was insufficient, 
leading to low and volatile economic growth. This paper examines the dynamics of 
productivity growth and in particular inter- and intra-industry dynamics, making use of a 
shift-share analysis and the rich detail available in a novel industry data set. The paper 
shows that Mexico has experienced an unfinished structural change, in which spells of intra 
sectoral productivity expansion have been hampered by severe  losses during crises,  
resulting in insufficient productivity growth over the period 1990-2012 to close the gap 
with its main trading partner, the United States. Moreover, despite a significant reallocation 
of hours worked across industries, its aggregate impact has been hindered by the prevalence 
of flows from industrial sectors with high labor productivity growth towards those with 
lower or contracting productivity growth. 
 
Keywords: Structural change; productivity growth; aggregate productivity; Mexico 
JEL Classification: N16, O11, O47 
 
 
The views expressed in this document, are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those 
of the Organization. 
a
 Corresponding author: Economic Affairs Officer, International Trade and Industry Unit 
(ramon.padilla@cepal.org). Postal address: Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra 193, 12th Floor, Colonia 
Granada, 11510, Mexico City, Mexico. Phone number: +52 5541705600. 
b
 Economic Affairs Officer, Economic Development Unit (francisco.villarreal@cepal.org). Postal 
address: Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra 193, 12th Floor, Colonia Granada, 11510, Mexico City, 
Mexico. Phone number: +52 5541705600. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is a wide acknowledgement that structural change is needed for long-term economic 
development (ECLAC, 2012; Lin, 2012; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011; UNIDO, 2009; 
Haussman and Rodrik, 2003). Since the industrial revolution, the rise of new economic 
powers has generally been driven by the structural transformation of their economies, 
characterized by the shift from primary production to manufacturing, or from 
manufacturing to services, and within manufacturing from natural-resource-based goods to 
medium and high-technology products (Lin, 2012; Memedovic and Iapadre, 2009). 
 
Structural change involves transforming the composition of output, international trade and 
employment (ECLAC, 2012). Through increasing productivity in existing activities, and 
moving towards more complex and technology-intensive sectors and processes, structural 
change is expected to lead to higher long-term economic growth, increased export 
competitiveness and better-paid jobs. 
 
Mexico is an interesting case among emerging economies to study structural change over 
the last three decades. Since the mid-1980s, Mexico’s economic policies and overall 
development orientation underwent extensive changes. The underlying premise was to use 
exports, instead of the domestic market, as the engine of growth and the private sector, 
instead of the State, as the driver of the new machine (Cordero et al., 2009).  
 
As a result, the export and production structure were transformed significantly: in 1986, 
exports of primary goods represented 45.6% of total exports, and by 2012 they had 
decreased to 17.4%. In contrast, exports of medium and high-technology products increased 
from 33.0% to 61.8% of total exports in the same period (ECLAC, 2014a). This 
concentration on medium and high-technology products is higher than in any of the so-
called BRICS countries1; in China those products accounted for 56.9% of total exports in 
2012 (ECLAC, 2014a). Mexico has also gone through a successful insertion into high-
growth global markets and has shown remarkable export competitiveness. Its market share 
in total United States’ imports, which is the largest import market in the world, rose from 
6.1% in 1990 to 12.2% in 2012, in spite of increasing Asian competition (ECLAC, 2014b). 
 
Yet Mexico has experienced low and volatile economic growth (between 1990 and 2012, 
Mexico’s economy grew only at 2.2% annually on average), which has been closely 
associated with slow productivity growth (McKinsey Global Institute, 2014; OECD, 2013; 
Kehoe and Ruhl, 2010; López-Córdova, 2003).  
 
This paper examines the dynamics of productivity by sector and assesses whether inter and 
intra-industry dynamics can account for sluggish aggregate productivity growth. The 
analysis decomposes labor productivity growth through the use of a shift-share analysis, 
taking advantage of a recently published industry-level database developed by the Mexican 
                                                          
1
 Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa. 
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National Statistics Office (INEGI) as part of the LA-KLEMS project 2  (INEGI, 2014; 
Aravena and Hofman 2014). The database consists of annual industry-level time-series of 
output, as well as labor, capital and intermediate inputs over the period 1990-2012. The 
level of disaggregation available in the database allows a detailed analysis of the dynamics 
of resource allocation across industries. To the best of our knowledge this study is the first 
to apply this methodology to analyze the Mexican case. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to show that Mexico has experienced an incomplete 
or unfinished structural change over the last three decades. Although it has succeeded in 
diversifying its production matrix and shifted towards more technologically complex 
industries, productivity growth has been unsatisfactory and quite below that of its main 
trading partner, the United States. On the one hand, productivity growth within sectors has 
been sluggish in general; on the other sectoral shifts have been characterized by the 
relocation from industries with high productivity expansion to those with low or negative 
rates of growth. The findings of this paper are relevant to other developing economies 
which have followed a similar economic development model, such as those of Central 
America. 
 
The paper is divided into four further sections. The first section presents the main concepts 
used in this paper, in particular a detailed definition of structural change. It also provides 
details about the database used to estimate productivity. The second section describes the 
main features of the Mexican economy under the economic model implemented in the 
previous three decades. The third section offers an in-depth analysis of productivity growth 
by sector in Mexico and its comparison with United States performance. The fourth section 
concludes. 
 
1. Conceptual framework and methodology 
 
Economic theory, since its origin, has given significant attention to structural change. For 
Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1817) the structural composition of the economy 
was strongly related to economic development and growth. By the same token, for 
economic development theory pioneers -such as Allan Fisher (1939), Hollis Chenery 
(1960), Arthur Lewis (1954), Luigi Pasinetti (1981) and Nicholas Kaldor (1957)- structural 
change is a key element for robust and sustainable growth. More recently, after the 
international 2008-2009 crisis, there has been a renewed interest in the quest for long-term 
economic growth and structural change has been brought to the fore again (e.g. ECLAC, 
2012; Lin, 2012; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). 
 
Structural change has been understood in many different ways. Three main complementary 
definitions are here adopted. First, structural change results from innovations and 
increasing productivity in existing sectors, which may come from product, process and 
                                                          
2
 The LA-KLEMS Project is based on the EU-KLEMS Project developed by the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre for the European Union (Ref needed). The KLEMS growth and productivity accounts 
include measures of output growth, productivity, employment and skill creation, capital formation and 
technological change at the industry level. The input measures include various categories of capital (K), 
labour (L), energy (E), materials (M) and services (S). 
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functional upgrading (ECLAC, 2012). Product upgrading is the development and 
commercialization of new or improved products with enhanced performance 
characteristics. Process upgrading involves the development and implementation of new or 
significantly improved production or delivery methods (OECD, 2005). Functional 
upgrading, in turn, means engaging in new and superior activities in the value chain, for 
instance, when a firm moves from components manufacturing to product design 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). 
 
Second, structural change has been commonly associated with long-term and persistent 
shifts in sectoral composition of economic systems. It entails modifications in the relative 
importance of different sectors over time, measured by their share in employment, output 
and trade (Memedovic and Iapadre, 2009; Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). But more 
important for long-term economic growth, it is characterized by an increase in the 
contribution of knowledge-intensive sectors or activities to output and trade and a denser 
and more diversified production matrix (ECLAC, 2012). 
 
Third, structural change is also associated to insertion into high-growth global markets, 
leading to growing aggregate demand, production and job creation (ECLAC, 2012). 
Therefore, it entails a transformation towards sectors and activities that are increasingly 
demanded in global markets. Growing market share of international markets is a result of 
this transformation. 
 
Economic catching-up theories assert that to open an economy to international trade creates 
the conditions to develop local technological capabilities and increase productivity, 
therefore engaging in a structural change process. This is based on the expected positive 
effects that opening up to international trade has on technological capabilities through 
exports of goods, imports of intermediate and capital goods and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). 
 
The catching-up theory in its simple form asserts that being backward in productivity level 
carries a potential for rapid advance. The catching-up theory can be traced back to Veblen’s 
(1915) and Gerschenkron’s (1962) analyses of the process by which England was overtaken 
by other countries such as Germany and Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In comparisons across countries, growth rates of productivity over long periods 
tend to be inversely related to the initial level of productivity. The central idea has to do 
with the level of technology embodied in a country’s capital stock. The larger the 
technological gap, and therefore the productivity gap between leader and follower, the 
stronger the follower’s potential for growth in productivity. 
 
However, according to Abramovitz (1986), “a country’s potential for rapid growth is strong 
not when it is backward without qualification, but rather when it is technologically 
backward but socially advanced” (p. 388). Thus the catching up process is conditioned on 
what Abramovitz called “social capabilities”, which are related to education, institutions, 
and policies. Based partly on the results of Easterly and Levine (2001), which highlight the 
importance of differences in productivity in explaining cross-country income heterogeneity, 
endogenous growth theory has further elaborated on the role of international trade and 
integration in the diffusion and absorption of technology (Keller, 2004). 
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At its most abstract level, productivity refers to the volume of outputs that can be produced 
from a given bundle of inputs. Its relevance stems from the fact that sustained differences in 
the rate of growth of productivity explain a substantial portion of the heterogeneity 
observed in income levels across countries (IADB, 2010; Crespi, 2010; Easterly and 
Levine, 2001). Thus, the analysis of its dynamics and its determinants is of the utmost 
importance from the perspective of development. 
 
The particular definition of productivity depends on the objective of measurement, as well 
as to the availability of data. Considering the close association between labor productivity 
and income per capita, this paper focuses on this measure which is defined as the quotient 
between value-added, expressed in constant terms, and the number of hours worked. 
 
The methodology used is a shift-share analysis of labor productivity (Fabricant, 1942). It 
allows the decomposition of changes in labor productivity into two components: pure-
productivity gains within industries (intra-sectoral or within change), and the effect due to 
the reallocation of resources across industries (inter-sectoral or between change). Following 
the work of Maudos et al. (2008), inter-sectoral changes in productivity are further 
decomposed into those which are due to the reallocation of resources to industries with 
higher productivity levels (static sectoral effect), and those due to the reallocation towards 
industries with higher rates of productivity growth (dynamic sectoral effect):  
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where  ⁄ −  ⁄  denotes aggregate labour productivity growth between periods T 
and 0, and 	, represent the share of hours worked in industry ) as a proportion of total 
hours worked during period T:  	, ≡ 	, ∑ 	,	 =⁄ 	, ⁄ . 
 
The decomposition afforded by the shift-share analysis isolates the different sources of 
productivity growth. The first term on the right hand side measures the change in 
productivity that would have occurred solely due to improvements in efficiency within 
industries. Thus, it reflects changes in productivity that result from supply-side driven 
innovations within industries (Schumpeter, 1939), along the lines of the first notion of 
structural change presented above. The second term measures productivity changes that 
would have occurred only due to the flow of labor across industries. That is, it measures the 
demand-side induced reallocation of resources between sectors (Pasinetti, 1981). This 
second term correspond to both the second and the third definitions of structural change. 
Finally the third term measures the interaction between labor flows across industries, and 
the productivity gains within industries, in line with the first and second concepts of 
structural change. Positive values of this term reflect what Baumol (1967) called the 
structural bonus that results from labor shifts from industries where productivity growth is 
low or contracting, towards industries where productivity is growing at a faster rate.  
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2. Export competitiveness and industrial recomposition in Mexico over the last three 
decades 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Mexico, as other Latin American countries, undertook a far 
reaching program of economic reforms in different areas: trade and industrial policy, 
foreign investment and capital account liberalization, privatization of public enterprises, 
and deregulation of domestic economic activities. 
 
Trade policy reform began with unilateral liberalization of international commerce in 1984. 
In 1986, Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
government committed itself to maximum tariff rates and pledged to continue the 
replacement of import controls by tariffs.  In the 1980s, 1990s and the first decade of the 
2000, Mexico was very active in negotiating and signing free trade agreements (FTAs) with 
various countries and regions. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with 
the United States and Canada, went into effect in January 1994. By 2013, FTAs had been 
signed with more than 40 countries, including the European Union, the European Free 
Trade Association, the five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia and 
Israel, locking up trade openness and securing significant tariff reductions for most of its 
tradable goods. 
 
As a result of this new economic model, Mexico’s exports have experienced an outstanding 
expansion over the last two decades: between 1993 and 2013, they grew at an annual 
average rate of 10.5% (in current dollars). Mexico is by far the largest exporter in Latin 
America, contributing with one-third of total regional exports. In 2013, its exports 
amounted to US$ 380.2 billion, well above Brazil’s US $242.2 billion.  
 
Export competitiveness, understood as an increasing market share, has been also 
noteworthy. In 2012, Mexico possessed 12.2% of total United States’ imports market, in 
comparison with 6.9% in 1993, in spite of increasing Asian competition. Mexico is the 
third largest exporter to the United States, just behind China and Canada. 
 
Moreover the composition of exports has undergone a significant transformation. A 
taxonomy proposed by Castaldi (2009), which combines the taxonomies of Pavitt (1984) 
and of Miozzo and Soete (2001), is here used.  The central idea behind the taxonomy is to 
classify industries according to both the sources and dynamics of innovation within 
industries. Manufacturing industries are classified into three categories: i) Scale intensive 
industries, whose efficiencies are to be found in the scale of their operations and whose 
innovations stem mostly in process improvement3; ii) Supplier dominated industries, which 
are characterized by the fact that they derive the majority of their innovations from 
improvements embodied in the capital and intermediate goods provided by specialized 
suppliers4; and finally iii) Science-based and specialized suppliers which rely mainly on 
                                                          
3
 Of particular interest for the case of Mexico, this category includes the manufacture of transport equipment, 
chemical products, and food products and beverages. 
4
 This category includes textiles, apparel and paper products. 
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formal research activities to produce their own innovations.5 An additional category of 
producers of primary products is included, to take into account all exports of goods. 
 
Figure 1 shows exports by category. In 1986, when Mexico signed the GATT, primary 
products represented 51.9% of total exports, whereas science-based and specialized 
suppliers accounted for 14.6%. By 2012, the share of primary goods had been reduced to 
19.5%, while the latter reached 38.4%. The share of supplier dominated and scale intensive 
goods in total exports was also increased between 1986 and 2012. In 2012, TV sets, mobile 
phones, computers and cars were among the most important exported products by Mexico. 
 
Figure 1 
Mexico: manufacturing exports of goods by category 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on ECLAC (Software SIGCI). 
 
Another indicator of the diversification of production structure is the total number of 
products exported. In 1986, Mexico exported 631 different goods (at four digits of the 
Standard International Trade Classification), while by 2012 the number had increased to 
745 (ECLAC, 2014a).  
 
Export growth was particularly robust in sectors that experienced a significant growth in 
global trade. In 2012, 53.7% of Mexico’s exports took place in sectors whose global trade 
grew above the average between 1990 and 2012 (COMTRADE, 2014). Indeed, its exports 
observed a significant increase not only in high-growth manufacturing goods, such as 
electronics and medical devices, but also in dynamic primary products such as oil, silver 
and flowers. 
 
                                                          
5
 It comprises pharmaceuticals, electronic goods and components, scientific instruments and electrical 
machinery and equipment. Pavitt’s original taxonomy distinguishes between science-based and specialized 
suppliers. Yet this paper groups them together because in Mexico they present similar features regarding 
innovation sources and dynamics. 
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Mexico’s exports to the United States’ market have been also oriented to dynamic sectors. 
Table 1 presents the structure of Mexico’s exports distinguishing two dimensions: the 
vertical axis differentiates dynamic products from stagnant products, that is those with 
positive growth in terms of their share or contribution to global United States’ imports from 
those with negative growth rates over a given period (1990-2012). In the same vein, the 
horizontal axis differentiates products with positive growth rates in terms of their share or 
contribution within Mexico’s exports to the United States from those with negative growth 
rates. The first quadrant groups products which increased their share in global United 
States’ imports, and at the same time increased their contribution within Mexico’s exports 
to the United States between 1990 and 2012. The second quadrant comprises products 
which increased their contribution to global United States’ imports, but decreased their 
share in Mexico’s exports to the United States. The third quadrant includes products which 
decreased both their contribution to global United States’ imports and to Mexico’s exports 
to the United States. Finally, the fourth quadrant includes products which increased their 
contribution to Mexico’s exports to the United States, but decreased their share in global 
United States’ imports. 
 
Table 1 
Mexico and the United States: product contribution matrix 1990-2012 
 
+ 
 
Product 
contribution to 
global United 
States’ imports 
 
- 
2nd quadrant 
 
20.4% 
1st quadrant 
 
49.9% 
3er quadrant  
 
5.8% 
4th quadrant 
 
23.9% 
-                 Product contribution to total                     + 
                     Mexico exports to the United States 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on software MAGIC (ECLAC, 2014). 
 
Between 1990 and 2012, 70.3% of Mexico’s exports were oriented to dynamic markets, 
that is products that increased their contribution in global United States’ imports (first and 
second quadrants), and a half (49.9%) increased their share in total Mexico’s exports to the 
United States (first quadrant).  
 
In summary, over the last three decades Mexico’s economy has gone successfully through 
two out of three factors of structural change: composition of exports and positive insertion 
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into global markets. The following section studies in detail the third factor needed for a 
complete structural change: productivity growth. 
 
3. Productivity growth and structural change 
 
The dataset for Mexico contains series for 68 industries over the period 1990-2012. In order 
to benchmark the performance of labor productivity, the results are compared to those of 
the United States, using the dataset developed by Jorgenson et al. (2012)6, which contains 
data for the period 1947-2010. Aside from the United States being the standard choice to 
benchmark the evolution of productivity growth, it is Mexico’s largest trading partner: in 
2013, 78.8% of Mexico’s exports were sent to the United States’ market. Moreover through 
NAFTA, the integration of certain sectors of the two countries, particularly manufacturing, 
has been substantial over the period studied. 
 
The top panel of figure 2 plots the annual GDP growth rates for Mexico and the United 
States. The first feature to note is that both series exhibit significant co-movement across 
the period studied, which reflects the extent of the linkages between both economies. The 
second aspect to remark is that economic growth in Mexico has been markedly more 
volatile, which in turn reflects the still elevated vulnerability of the Mexican economy to 
internal and external shocks. 
 
The bottom panel of figure 2 shows the evolution of labor productivity in both countries, 
where for comparison purposes the value for 1990 has been normalized to 100. The 
evolution of labor productivity in Mexico clearly reflects the volatility of aggregate growth. 
Moreover, while economic growth has been relatively similar over the 1990-2012 period, 
since the second half of the 1990s labor productivity growth in Mexico has persistently 
lagged behind that of the United States, thus increasing the already sizeable productivity 
gap. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that slow productivity growth has been closely associated 
with modest economic growth, as has been previously analyzed by various authors 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2014; OECD, 2013; Kehoe and Ruhl, 2010; López-Córdova, 
2003). Between 1990 and 2012, Mexico’s economy grew only at 2.2% annually on 
average. 
 
The average annual growth rate of labor productivity in Mexico over the period 1990-2012 
was 1.1%, which is significantly lower than the rate of 1.7% of the United States. With 
respect to other middle income Latin American countries, Hofman et al. (2014) found that 
over the period 1995-2007 labor productivity growth in Mexico doubled the rate found for 
Brazil (0,63%), but lagged behind those of Argentina (1,68%), Chile (2.56%) and the 
United States (2,02%). To put these growth rates into perspective, they imply that whereas 
it would take 28 and 35 years for productivity levels in Chile and the United States, 
respectively, to double, it would take 43 years for Argentina, 60 years for the case of 
Mexico and over 100 years for Brazil. 
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 Since price and volume data for the United States are chain-weighted, aggregation of industry-level volume 
data is carried out by constructing appropriate Thornqvist price indices to deflate current value series. 
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Figure 2 
Mexico and the United States 1990-2012: GDP growth and labor productivity 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on INEGI (2014)  and Jorgenson et al. (2012) 
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The evolution of productivity highlights two salient features of the Mexican economy. 
First, shifts in sectoral composition and insertion into high-growth global markets have not 
been accompanied by rapid productivity growth. Therefore, it is here argued that Mexico 
has experienced an incomplete or unfinished structural change. Second, economic theory 
predicts that growing integration between two economies should result in convergence of 
labor productivity, however the gap between the United States’ and Mexico’s productivity 
has widened over the last two decades.  
 
As is well known, countries in general go through phases of growth, stagnation and decline. 
Taking this into consideration, in addition to the results for the whole sample the shift-share 
decomposition is computed for the growth periods identified within the sample for Mexico. 
The growth periods are bracketed by the occurrence of three crises, which resulted in 
recessions of varying magnitude in Mexico. The first occurred in 1995 associated to severe 
mismatches in the Mexican balance of payments. The second took place in 2001, as a 
consequence of the piercing of the so-called dot-com bubble in the United States. The final 
crisis spilled over from the United States to the global financial system in 2008-2009.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the shift-share decomposition for both countries for the four identified 
growth periods, as well as for the whole sample. The figures in the top panel correspond to 
the annual average growth rates of each component, while those in the bottom panel are the 
contributions of each component to total change. As previously noted, commencing with 
the full sample (column 5), the growth rate of labor productivity in Mexico is significantly 
smaller than the one observed for the United States. This reflects differences in both the 
relative importance of the components and in the growth rates. 
 
As for the relative importance of the components, inspection of the bottom panel of table 2 
shows that, in close association with different levels of development between the two 
countries, in the United States all productivity growth was originated by intra-industry 
improvement, while in Mexico 37,8% percent of productivity growth was due to the flow 
of labor between industries.  
 
Hofman et al. (2014) find similar results when comparing developed and emerging 
economies: on average the contribution of the inter-industry effect on aggregate labor 
productivity change for Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom over the period 1995-2007 is less than one percent; 
whereas its contribution for Argentina and Chile are 16% and 11%, respectively. 
 
Regarding the growth rate of the components, the expansion of the intra-industry effect in 
Mexico (0.7%) has been less than a half of the rate of the United States (1.8%). Although 
the growth rate of the inter-industry component in the United States is negative, its weight 
is negligible, whereas for Mexico its growth rate has averaged 0.4%. In contrast to 
catching-up theories, the productivity gap between Mexico and the United States has not 
led to faster expansion in the former. In addition, the United States, given its economic 
development level, seems to have depleted the space to increase productivity through inter-
industry shifts, whereas Mexico still has some room.  
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The decomposition of inter-industry change contributions in Mexico sheds light into the 
effect of the reallocation of resources across industries. The top panel shows that while the 
static effect has experienced an average annual rate of 0.8%, the dynamic effect has 
actually contracted by 0.4% on average. Examining the contributions of each of the 
components to total change, the bottom panel clearly indicates that the shifts in the relative 
weights of each industry with respect to total hours worked, that is the static effect, explains 
close to 70% of total productivity growth. However, the negative sign on the contribution 
of the dynamic effect, which halves the aggregate structural change effect, implies that 
despite the higher productivity level of industries which are absorbing a larger labor share, 
the rate of productivity growth is stagnant or contracting. The labor market in both 
countries is highly dynamic, allowing for significant shifts among sectors. Yet, in the 
United States such shifts have been towards more dynamic sectors.  
 
 
 
Table 2 
Mexico and United States: Shift-share decomposition of labor productivity growth 
        
(1) 1990-
1994 
(2) 1995-
2000 
(3) 2003-
2007 
(4) 2009-
2012c 
(5) 1990-
2012d 
Annual average growth rates   
Mexico 
Labour productivity change 2.2 1.0 1.0 2.4 1.1 
Intraindustry effect 3.9 -0.1 0.8 2.5 0.7 
Interindustry effect -1.9 1.1 0.2 -0.1 0.4 
Static effect -0.9 1.4 0.3 -0.1 0.8 
Dynamic Effect -1.0 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 
United States a 
Labour productivity change 1.9 2.3 0.8 2.7 1.7 
Intraindustry effect 2.1 2.6 0.8 2.9 1.8 
Interindustry effect -2.7 -2.0 -3.4 -1.8 -2.5 
Static effect -2.7 -2.0 -3.4 -1.8 -2.5 
    Dynamic Effect -2.5 -1.7 -3.5 -1.6 -2.3 
Contribution to aggregate labour productivity change   
Mexico 
Labour productivity change 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Intraindustry effect 180.2 -11.6 82.1 103.4 62.2 
Interindustry effect -80.2 111.6 17.9 -3.4 37.8 
Static effect -38.3 144.1 26.3 -2.2 68.8 
Dynamic Effect -41.8 -32.5 -8.4 -1.2 -31.0 
United States b 
Labour productivity change 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Intraindustry effect 105.0 108.1 99.4 104.8 102.8 
Interindustry effect -5.0 -8.1 0.6 -4.8 -2.8 
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Static effect -4.4 -7.6 0.9 -4.9 -2.5 
      Dynamic Effect -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 
Notes:  
a\ Since the series for the United States are chain-weighted, annual average volume growth rates are 
computed by first calculating the nominal growth rate, and then deflating by the corresponding Thornqvist 
index approximation to the Fisher ideal index (see Whelan 2000 for details) 
b\ For the case of the United States the contribution of each component to aggregate labour productivity 
changes is approximated using nominal shares.  
c\ 2009-2010 for the United States 
d\ 1990-2010 for the United States 
Source: Own elaboration based on INEGI (2014) and Jorgenson et al. (2012) 
 
 
 
 
The analysis by growth spells reveal that except for the 1995-2000 period, aggregate 
productivity in Mexico during expansion episodes has grown at rates that are comparable to 
those of the United States. This means that part of the lower productivity expansion 
observed in Mexico for the full period is explained by the losses that occur during crises7. 
Indeed the data indicate that in the 1995 labor productivity contracted by 1% in Mexico and 
only 0.2% in the United States. Similarly, whereas labor productivity in Mexico fell by an 
average of 2% during the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, in the United States labor 
productivity grew 1.1% during the same period. In 2001 when Mexico’s labor productivity 
slowed down to 1.1%, it grew at a rate of 2.3% in the United States. That is, despite 
exhibiting comparable growth rates during growth spells, labor productivity in Mexico is 
markedly pro-cyclical during downturns, whereas it exhibits countercyclical behavior in the 
United States. 
 
With the exception of the second half of the 1990s, in a similar fashion to what has 
occurred in the United States over the period studied, the main driver of aggregate 
productivity growth in Mexico has been the effect of improvements within industries. 
However in contrast to what is predicated by catching-up theories, the effect of the 
reassignment of resources across industries was negative during the early 1990s and again 
during the most recent period.  
 
Analyzing the contribution of the components of the inter-industry effect, the results 
indicate that during periods of relatively rapid productivity growth (1990-1994 and 2009-
2012) the static effect has been negative, that is labor has flowed from industries with 
relatively high productivity levels to those with lower productivity levels. As discussed 
below this could be the result of industry-specific capital intensive investments which 
increase productivity at the expense of relative labor demand. For its part, the negative sign 
of the dynamic effect, which signifies that labor flows away from industries where 
                                                          
7
 In a cross-country comparison of business cycle characteristics over the period 1990-2012, Titelman et al. 
(2013) find that the amplitude and duration of cycles in Mexico during expansions is of a similar magnitude 
to the average of selected high income countries, and outperforms the average of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Nonetheless they are smaller and shorter than those observed in other developing regions, notably 
East Asia and the Pacific. 
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productivity is growing faster, exhibits a diminishing pace and was zero during the most 
recent growth spell. 
 
3.1 Productivity growth at the sector level 
 
Taking advantage of the level of detail available in the data set, the analysis is further 
disaggregated with the purpose of identifying which groups of industries, if any, are driving 
the growth of aggregate labor productivity, and to identify the direction of labor flows 
across industries. In order to keep the analysis tractable, the industries are classified 
according to the taxonomy described in section 2. In addition to manufacturing, service 
industries are classified into analogous categories, with the exception of scale intensive 
services, which are further broken down into industries involved in the development and 
management of physical and information networks. Within the classification of physical 
networks industries, two subcategories are identified: the first contains industries related to 
trade activities, and the second those involved in storage and distribution. This is done 
because despite the existence of large firms, trade in Mexico is characterized by the 
presence of a large number of small and mostly informal firms. 
 
In order to capture the flows of resources for the whole economy, two additional categories 
are also considered. The first, labeled other production, includes construction and utilities, 
while the second category comprises non-market services, which are services mainly 
provided by the state. The details of the mapping of individual industries into the 
aforementioned categories are shown in table A in the appendix. 
 
Table 3 provides details of the contributions of the different industrial categories over the 
period 1990-20128. As before, the top panel presents the results for Mexico and the bottom 
panel those for the United States. The first row of each panel of table 3 replicates the 
magnitudes presented on the last column of the bottom panel of table 19. The rest of the 
rows show the contribution of each industrial category to the total industries aggregate, that 
is the individual category’s effects add up to the intermediate and eventually to the total 
aggregate.  
 
The first feature to note is that in general growth rates in Mexico lag behind those of the 
United States by a wide margin, with the gap in market services explaining the bulk of the 
gap in aggregate labor productivity growth rates.  
 
Manufacturing productivity growth in Mexico (2.1%) was much lower than in the same 
industry in the United States (4.6%), in spite of the close integration between those 
                                                          
8
 In the interest of brevity, the results for the growth episodes are omitted. However they are available from 
the authors upon request. 
9
 It is important to note that the average growth rates for the different classifications (column 1) were 
computed as the quotient between value added and hours worked, with both magnitudes aggregated at the 
corresponding classification level. This implicitly assumes that hours worked are perfect substitutes across 
industries, which may be a reasonable assumption for similarly sized and related industries but less so as the 
level of aggregation increases. This gives rise to some counterintuitive results such as the average growth rate 
of manufacturing exceeding the average growth rates of its constituent classifications as a result of what 
statisticians call the amalgamation paradox (Simpson, 1951).  
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countries, in particular in this industry. The higher growth rate in the United States was 
boosted by an impressive dynamism of science-based and specialized services manufacture 
(14.9%). In contrast, in Mexico this category, which in 2013 accounted for 38.4% of total 
exports, only grew 1.7%. This fact illustrates that although industries such as electronics, 
aeronautics and scientific instruments are considered knowledge-intensive industries in 
developed economies, in Mexico they are dominated by labor and scale-intensive process 
with much lower productivity growth (Padilla-Pérez and Hérnandez, 2010).  
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Table 3: Mexico and the United States: Incidence on the change in aggregate labor productivity 
Inter industry effect 
          
(1) Average 
growth rate 
1990-2012 
(2) Intra 
industry 
effect (3) Static (4) Dynamic (5) Total 
Mexico         
Total industries 1.1 62.2 68.8 -31.0 37.8 
Primary products 0.1 -11.0 18.2 -16.7 1.4 
Other production -0.4 1.7 10.3 -4.2 6.2 
Manufacturing 2.1 34.9 -23.0 -2.2 -25.2 
Scale intensive 1.9 28.1 -16.5 -1.8 -18.3 
Supplier dominated 1.6 3.7 -6.7 -0.3 -7.0 
Science-based and specialised suppliers 1.7 3.2 0.3 -0.1 0.2 
Market services 1.4 31.4 63.8 -5.5 58.3 
Supplier dominated services 0.5 7.5 -2.8 -1.6 -4.5 
Scale intensive services: Physical networks 1.2 23.4 14.6 -0.8 13.8 
Trade 1.3 17.0 15.6 -0.3 15.3 
Storage and distribution 1.0 6.5 -1.0 -0.5 -1.6 
Scale intensive services: Information networks 1.7 -0.7 47.8 -2.8 44.9 
Knowledge intensive business services 0.7 1.1 4.3 -0.2 4.1 
  Non-market services 0.2 5.2 -0.5 -2.4 -3.0 
United Statesa         
Total industries 1.7 102.8 -2.5 -0.3 -2.8 
Primary products 1.1 2.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 
Other production -1.1 5.3 -1.2 0.0 -1.2 
Manufacturing 4.6 17.6 -8.6 -0.4 -9.0 
Scale intensive 1.4 8.9 -3.8 -0.2 -4.0 
Supplier dominated 3.0 3.7 -2.5 -0.1 -2.6 
Science-based and specialised suppliers 14.9 5.0 -2.2 -0.2 -2.4 
Market services 2.1 57.6 3.0 0.0 3.0 
Supplier dominated services 0.0 5.7 1.2 0.0 1.2 
Scale intensive services: Physical networks 3.2 11.8 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 
Trade 3.8 9.5 -0.7 0.0 -0.8 
Storage and distribution 2.1 2.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 
Scale intensive services: Information networks 2.9 25.5 -0.9 -0.1 -1.0 
Knowledge intensive business services 1.7 14.6 3.3 0.1 3.4 
    Non-market services -0.1 20.0 4.3 0.1 4.5 
a/ 1990-2010 for the United States 
Source: Own elaboration based on KLEMS data. 
17 
 
Productivity growth in the United States was also higher in supplier-dominated 
manufactures (3% versus 1.6% in Mexico) but not in scale-intensive manufactures (1.9% 
versus 1.4%). The latter, which accounted for 35.6% of total exports of goods in Mexico in 
2013 and comprises industries such as transport equipment, food products and beverages, 
has experienced significant productivity growth based mainly on process innovations and 
acquisition of machinery and equipment (Padilla-Pérez and Hernández, 2010; Abdel-
Musik, 2004) . 
 
In addition, substantial differences regarding the relative importance of the diverse 
categories are observed. As can be verified in column 2, in Mexico the main driver of intra-
industry productivity growth has been manufacturing, with the scale intensive products 
category explaining almost half of aggregate within-industry change, followed by physical 
networks which largely reflect intra-industry productivity gains in trade activities. For its 
part, in the United States information networks is the most dynamic sector, whereas taken 
together manufacturing industries account for less than 20% of aggregate intra-industry 
productivity growth.  
 
Since in general the contribution of inter-industry changes to productivity in the United 
States is relatively small and thus not comparable to Mexico, in the remainder of this 
section the analysis focuses on the sources of aggregate inter-industry change for Mexico. 
 
The third column of table 3 shows the contribution of the static inter-industry effect, which 
as discussed above is positive (negative) for those categories whose share in total hours 
worked increased (decreased) during the period studied. According to the traditional 
conception of structural change, negative (positive) static effects should be expected in 
those industries with relatively low (high) productivity levels. Yet what is observed in the 
data is a massive flow from manufacturing, which as recently noted is the main driver of 
intra-industry productivity gains, and to a lesser extent from non-market services into the 
rest of the economy with market services in general, and trade activities in particular, 
absorbing the lion’s share of these flows. A possible explanation is that intra-industry 
productivity gains in manufacturing have been the result of investment in capital-intensive 
technologies which have resulted in a reduction of manufacturing’s relative demand for 
labor.  
 
Although the aggregate effect of this recomposition of hours worked across sectors is 
positive, the results in the fourth column show that the reallocation has been very 
inefficient, since the generalized negative sign signifies that either: a) industrial categories 
with high intra-industry productivity growth rates, such as the manufacturing case 
discussed above, are reducing their share in total hours worked, or b) labor is flowing 
towards sectors whose within-industry productivity is falling, such as primary products, 
information networks and non-market services.  
 
It is remarkable that intra-industry labor productivity has actually declined within 
information networks, since they include telecommunications and banking, which have 
been characterized by the introduction of new technologies over the past two decades10. In 
                                                          
10
 See, for instance, OECD (2000). 
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fact closer inspection reveals that the loss of productivity for this category is driven by the 
real estate sector, which has experienced significant productivity losses, only partially 
compensated by the gains posted by telecommunications, financial services and to a lesser 
extent, radio and television. In a similar fashion, practically the totality of the large negative 
dynamic effect observed in primary production is the result of an expansion in the relative 
share of hours worked in oil and gas extraction, which has experienced important 
productivity losses.  
 
Within the scale intensive sector, the majority of the decrease of the dynamic effect is due 
to the reduction in the share of total hours worked in petroleum products manufacturing and 
the basic metal industry, which are the top two scale intensive industries in terms of gross 
productivity gains. The effect was only partly offset by the modest expansion in the share 
of hours worked in transport equipment manufacturing which ranks third in gross 
productivity growth over the studied period.  
 
In aggregate, as shown in the last column of table 3, the negative dynamic effect halves the 
impact of labor shifting across industries. In other words, if as predicted by the theory labor 
had shifted from low to high productivity industries, aggregate labor productivity growth 
over the last two decades could have been almost a third higher in Mexico. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Over the last two decades, Mexico has gone through an unfinished structural change 
process. There has been a shift towards more knowledge-intensive industries, the 
production matrix has been diversified and exports have oriented successfully towards 
dynamic markets. Yet productivity growth has been insufficient and way below that of its 
main trade partner, the United States. Furthermore, structural change has resulted in shifts 
of labor force from sectors with high productivity growth to those with low productivity 
expansion, evidencing a significant structural heterogeneity 
 
This paper analyzed the role of the reallocation of hours worked across industries over the 
period 1990-2012 in the determination of labor productivity growth, disaggregating sectoral 
dynamics. The results show that labor productivity growth in Mexico was notably lower 
than that of the United States between 1990 and 2012. Consequently, the productivity gap 
between those countries widened, in spite of their increasing trade integration. During 
economic expansion periods, Mexico’s labor productivity has grown at a similar rate to that 
of the United States. However, economic downturns have been both more frequent and 
deeper in the former, impacting negatively its annual average growth rate. 
 
The main source of labor productivity growth in Mexico was intra-industry productivity 
gains, driven by improvements found within scale intensive manufacturing and trade. In 
contrast to the United States, where the impact of the reallocation of resources across 
industries is negligible, reflecting its level of development, in Mexico close to 40% of 
structural change is due to the inter industry effect.  
 
Although the flow of labor has in general been from low productivity to higher productivity 
industries, as evidenced by the positive aggregate static effect, certain high-productivity 
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industries such as scale intensive manufacturing have seen a decline in their relative labor 
share in favor of sectors with lower productivity levels such as the production of primary 
products. Moreover, the generalized negative sign of the dynamic effect indicates that labor 
is flowing from industries where productivity is growing faster towards industries where 
productivity is either growing at a slower pace or contracting. In aggregate terms, the inter 
industry effect points towards a deindustrialization, which in contrast to what has been 
observed in developed countries, in Mexico it has taken place in an environment of low 
productivity growth and with labor flowing towards a services sector with very modest 
productivity. 
 
The new economic model has successfully achieved some of its main goals: export 
competitiveness, production diversification, closer integration with the United States 
economy and a shift towards more complex industries. However, these achievements have 
not been accompanied by robust productivity growth, hampering economic growth as 
shown by various authors (for instance, ECLAC, 2012 and 2014c; OECD, 2013; Kehoe and 
Ruhl, 2010; López-Córdova, 2003). 
 
Three final remarks emerge from the analysis. First, active public policies are needed to 
foster productivity growth in all sectors. The substantial productivity growth differences 
between science-based and specialized suppliers manufactures in the United States and 
Mexico illustrates that the shift towards more complex industries in the former country has 
not been accompanied by increasing innovation capabilities. Policies to support human 
capital formation, research and development activities and infrastructure, among others, are 
needed to strengthen productivity growth. Following Abramovitz (1986), a country has 
strong potential for productivity growth, as a result of economic integration with a 
technologically-advanced nation, if it has previously developed social capabilities. 
 
Second, low productivity growth in market services is closely associated with a large 
informal sector. Micro and small-sized firms that do not have access to credit and new 
sources of knowledge and technologies, struggle hard to increase productivity. Since 
market services are attracting a significant amount of the labor force released by more 
productive sectors, public policies are urgently needed to support the informal sector. 
 
Third, economic crises over the last two decades have hindered significantly long-term 
productivity growth in Mexico. During economic growth periods between 1995 and 2012, 
the productivity gap between the United States and Mexico has been reduced. Yet 
economic crises as a result of both domestic and external shocks have had a disruptive 
effect on productivity growth in Mexico. Counter-cyclical economic policies, which pay 
more attention to real stability rather than to nominal, are also needed. 
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Appendix 
Table A 
Industry 
NAICS 2007 
Codes Category 
Agriculture 111 Primary products 
Animal breeding and production 112 Primary products 
Forestry 113 Primary products 
Fishing, hunting and trapping 114 Primary products 
Services related to agricultural and forestry activities 115 Primary products 
Oil and gas extraction/Services related to mining/Pipeline 
transportation 
211/213/486 Primary products 
Metallic and nonmetallic ore mining, except oil and gas 212 Primary products 
Electric power generation, transmission and distribution 221 Other production 
Water and gas supply through mains to final consumers 222 Other production 
Construction 236 Other production 
Civil engineering construction works 237 Other production 
Specialized construction works 238 Other production 
Food industry 311 Scale intensive 
Beverage and tobacco industries 312 Scale intensive 
Textile inputs manufacturing, and textiles finishing 313 Supplier dominated 
Textile products manufacturing, except apparel 314 Supplier dominated 
Apparel manufacturing 315 Supplier dominated 
Leather and hide tanning and finishing, and manufacturing of leather, 
hide and allied materials products 
316 Supplier dominated 
Wood industry 321 Supplier dominated 
Paper industry 322 Supplier dominated 
Printing and related industries 323 Supplier dominated 
Petroleum and coal products manufacturing 324 Scale intensive 
Chemical industry 325 Scale intensive 
Plastic and rubber industry 326 Scale intensive 
Nonmetallic mineral products manufacturing 327 Scale intensive 
Basic metal industry 331 Scale intensive 
Metal products manufacturing 332 Scale intensive 
Machinery and equipment manufacturing 333 Science based and 
specialized suppliers 
Manufacturing of computer, communications, and measuring 
equipment, and other electronic equipment, components and 
appliances manufacturing 
334 Science based and 
specialized suppliers 
Electric appliances, accessories and electric power generation 
equipment manufacturing 
335 Science based and 
specialized suppliers 
Transportation equipment manufacturing 336 Scale intensive 
Furniture, mattresses and blinds manufacturing 337 Supplier dominated 
Other manufacturing industries 339 Supplier dominated 
Trade 430 Physical networks 
(trade) 
Air transportation 481 Physical networks 
(storage and 
distribution) 
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Industry 
NAICS 2007 
Codes Category 
Rail transportation 482 Physical networks 
(storage and 
distribution) 
Water transportation 483 Physical networks 
(storage and 
distribution) 
Freight truck transportation 484 Physical networks 
(storage and 
distribution) 
Passenger transportation by road, except by rail/Sightseeing 
transportation 
485/487 Physical networks 
(storage and 
distribution) 
Services related to transportation 488 Physical networks 
(storage and 
distribution) 
Postal services/Courier and messenger services 491/492 Physical networks 
(storage and 
distribution) 
Warehousing services 493 Physical networks 
(storage and 
distribution) 
Newspaper, magazine, book, software and other materials publishing, 
and integrated publishing and printing of these publications 
511 Supplier dominated 
Film and video industry, and sound recording industry 512 Supplier dominated 
Radio and television/Other information services 515/519 Information networks 
Telecommunications/Electronic data processing, hosting, and other 
related services 
517/518 Information networks 
Financial and insurance services 52 Information networks 
Real estate services 531 Information networks 
Rental and leasing of tangible goods 532 Supplier dominated 
services 
Rental services of trademarks, patents and franchises/Head offices 533/551 Knowledge intensive 
business services 
Professional, scientific and technical services 541 Knowledge intensive 
business services 
Business support services/Waste management and remediation 
services 
561/562 Supplier dominated 
services 
Educational services 611 Non-market services 
Outpatient medical services and related services 621 Non-market services 
Hospitals 622 Non-market services 
Social assistance and health care residential facilities 623 Non-market services 
Other social assistance services 624 Non-market services 
Artistic, cultural and sporting services, and other related services 711 Supplier dominated 
services 
Museums, historical sites, zoos and similar institutions 712 Supplier dominated 
services 
Amusement services in recreational facilities and other recreational 
services 
713 Supplier dominated 
services 
26 
 
Industry 
NAICS 2007 
Codes Category 
Temporary accommodation services 721 Supplier dominated 
services 
Food and beverage preparation services 722 Supplier dominated 
services 
Repair and maintenance services 811 Physical networks 
(trade) 
Personal services 812 Supplier dominated 
services 
Associations and Organizations 813 Supplier dominated 
services 
Private households employing domestic personnel 814 Supplier dominated 
services 
Legislative, governmental and justice administration activities 931 Non-market services 
Extraterritorial and international organizations 932 Non-market services 
 
